On ordered weighted averaging aggregation operators in multicriteria decisionmaking
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
A technique for counting natted hosts
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
A multifaceted approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Revealing botnet membership using DNSBL counter-intelligence
SRUTI'06 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Examining the impact of website take-down on phishing
Proceedings of the anti-phishing working groups 2nd annual eCrime researchers summit
An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of internet miscreants
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Characterizing botnets from email spam records
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Behind phishing: an examination of phisher modi operandi
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Measurements and mitigation of peer-to-peer-based botnets: a case study on storm worm
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Spamalytics: an empirical analysis of spam marketing conversion
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on CyberSecurity and Intelligence Informatics
Aggregation Functions: A Guide for Practitioners
Aggregation Functions: A Guide for Practitioners
Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The WOMBAT Attack Attribution Method: Some Results
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users
NSPW '09 Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
Learning more about the underground economy: a case-study of keyloggers and dropzones
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
The nocebo effect on the web: an analysis of fake anti-virus distribution
LEET'10 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and more
HARMUR: storing and analyzing historic data on malicious domains
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security
A strategic analysis of spam botnets operations
Proceedings of the 8th Annual Collaboration, Electronic messaging, Anti-Abuse and Spam Conference
Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cloak and dagger: dynamics of web search cloaking
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Industrial espionage and targeted attacks: understanding the characteristics of an escalating threat
RAID'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses
Exploiting visual appearance to cluster and detect rogue software
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Bitsquatting: exploiting bit-flips for fun, or profit?
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Analyzing and defending against web-based malware
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Rogue antivirus software has recently received extensive attention, justified by the diffusion and efficacy of its propagation. We present a longitudinal analysis of the rogue antivirus threat ecosystem, focusing on the structure and dynamics of this threat and its economics. To that end, we compiled and mined a large dataset of characteristics of rogue antivirus domains and of the servers that host them. The contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we offer the first, to our knowledge, broad analysis of the infrastructure underpinning the distribution of rogue security software by tracking 6,500 malicious domains. Secondly, we show how to apply attack attribution methodologies to correlate campaigns likely to be associated to the same individuals or groups. By using these techniques, we identify 127 rogue security software campaigns comprising 4,549 domains. Finally, we contextualize our findings by comparing them to a different threat ecosystem, that of browser exploits. We underline the profound difference in the structure of the two threats, and we investigate the root causes of this difference by analyzing the economic balance of the rogue antivirus ecosystem. We track 372,096 victims over a period of 2 months and we take advantage of this information to retrieve monetization insights. While applied to a specific threat type, the methodology and the lessons learned from this work are of general applicability to develop a better understanding of the threat economies.