Channel-change games in spectrum-agile wireless networks
Channel-change games in spectrum-agile wireless networks
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
Game theory and the design of self-configuring, adaptive wireless networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Radio resource sharing games: enabling QoS support in unlicensed bands
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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The proliferation of wireless networks on unlicensed communication bands is leading to coexisting networks, creating interference problems. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model of dynamic channel change for multiple highly interfering cognitive wireless networks. The channel-change decisions depend on the number of coexisting networks and the cost of channel change. Game-theoretic analysis reflects the choices and motivations of independent, rational, selfish decision makers that do not trust one another. The channel-change probability is shown to increase with the number of coexisting networks. We also compare these decisions to idealized, socially optimal decisions that maximize the expected benefit of the coexisting networks. The difference between the two analyses gives the cost of noncooperation. We see that this cost goes down as the number of networks increases.