On power-law relationships of the Internet topology
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Practical network support for IP traceback
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication
Top-Down Network Design
Measuring ISP topologies with rocketfuel
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Network topology generators: degree-based vs. structural
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
On the Sensitivity of Network Simulation to Topology
MASCOTS '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunications Systems
User-level internet path diagnosis
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
On inferring and characterizing internet routing policies
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
A measurement study of available bandwidth estimation tools
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Packet-dispersion techniques and a capacity-estimation methodology
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The internet AS-level topology: three data sources and one definitive metric
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Inferring internet denial-of-service activity
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Nettimer: a tool for measuring bottleneck link, bandwidth
USITS'01 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems - Volume 3
Optimal Routing Design
INFOCOM'96 Proceedings of the Fifteenth annual joint conference of the IEEE computer and communications societies conference on The conference on computer communications - Volume 2
A service architecture for ATM: from applications to scheduling
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Distributed change-point detection of DDoS attacks: experimental results on DETER testbed
DETER Proceedings of the DETER Community Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test on DETER Community Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test 2007
SWOON: a testbed for secure wireless overlay networks
CSET'08 Proceedings of the conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
AnomBench: a benchmark for volume-based internet anomaly detection
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Implementation of an emulation environment for large scale network security experiments
ACC'11/MMACTEE'11 Proceedings of the 13th IASME/WSEAS international conference on Mathematical Methods and Computational Techniques in Electrical Engineering conference on Applied Computing
Classification of UDP traffic for DDoS detection
LEET'12 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
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There is a critical need for a common evaluation methodology for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) defenses, to enable their independent evaluation and comparison. We describe our work on developing this methodology, which consists of: (i) a benchmark suite defining the elements necessary to recreate DDoS attack scenarios in a testbed setting, (ii) a set of performance metrics that express a defense system's effectiveness, cost, and security, and (iii) a specification of a testing methodology that provides guidelines on using benchmarks and summarizing and interpreting performance measures. We identify three basic elements of a test scenario: (i) the attack, (ii) the legitimate traffic, and (iii) the network topology including services and resources. The attack dimension defines the attack type and features, while the legitimate traffic dimension defines the mix of the background traffic that interacts with the attack and may experience a denial-of-service effect. The topology/resource dimension describes the limitations of the victim network that the attack targets or interacts with. It captures the physical topology, and the diversity and locations of important network services. We apply two approaches to develop relevant and comprehensive test scenarios for our benchmark suite: (1) we use a set of automated tools to harvest typical attack, legitimate traffic, and topology samples from the Internet, and (2) we study the effect that select features of the attack, legitimate traffic and topology/resources have on the attack impact and the defense effectiveness, and use this knowledge to automatically generate a comprehensive testing strategy for a given defense.