Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Detection of Invalid Routing Announcement in the Internet
DSN '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Locating internet routing instabilities
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Listen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Finding a needle in a haystack: pinpointing significant BGP routing changes in an IP network
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Detecting BGP configuration faults with static analysis
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Modeling adoptability of secure BGP protocols
SIGMETRICS '06/Performance '06 Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Modeling adoptability of secure BGP protocol
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Efficient and secure source authentication with packet passports
SRUTI'06 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet - Volume 2
Cooperative Management Framework for Inter-domain Routing System
ATC '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
Comparing ingress and egress detection to secure interdomain routing: An experimental analysis
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
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The security of the Internet's interdomain routing system hinges on whether autonomous systems (ASes) can trust the information they receive from each other via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Frequently, this trust has been misguided, resulting in wide-spread outages and significant concerns about future attacks. Despite the seriousness of these problems, proposals for a more secure version of BGP have been stymied by serious impediments to practical deployment. Instead, we argue that the existing trust relationships between network operators (and the institutions they represent) are a powerful force for improving the security of BGP, without changing the underlying routing protocol. Our approach leverages ideas from online reputation systems to allow ASes to form a peer-to-peer overlay that integrates results from local network-management tools for detecting attacks and configuration errors. The proposed architecture is incrementally deployable, protects against shilling attacks, and deters malicious operator behavior.