Automated refinement of security protocols

Authors:
Anders M. Hagalisletto
Affiliations:
University of Oslo, Department of Computer Science, Oslo, Norway
Venue:
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Year:
2006

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Abstract

The design of security protocols is usually performed manually by pen and paper, by experts in security. Assumptions are rarely specified explicitly. We present a new way to approach security specification: The protocol is refined fully automated into a specification that contains assumptions sufficient to execute the protocol. As a result, the protocol designer using our method does not have to be a security expert to design a protocol, and can learn immediately how the protocol should work in practice.