Analysis of an algorithm for distributed recognition and accountability

  • Authors:
  • Calvin Ko;Deborah A. Frincke;Terrance Goan, Jr.;Todd Heberlein;Karl Levitt;Biswanath Mukherjee;Christopher Wee

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA;Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA

  • Venue:
  • CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 1993

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Abstract

Computer and network systems are vulnerable to attacks. Abandoning the existing huge infrastructure of possibly-insecure computer and network systems is impossible, and replacing them by totally secure systems may not be feasible or cost effective. A common element in many attacks is that a single user will often attempt to intrude upon multiple resources throughout a network. Detecting the attack can become significantly easier by compiling and integrating evidence of such intrusion attempts across the network rather than attempting to assess the situation from the vantage point of only a single host. To solve this problem, we suggest an approach for distributed recognition and accountability (DRA), which consists of algorithms which “process”, at a central location, distributed and asynchronous “reports” generated by computers (or a subset thereof) throughout the network. Our highest-priority objectives are to observe ways by which an individual moves around in a network of computers, including changing user names to possibly hide his/her true identity, and to associate all activities of multiple instances of the same individual to the same networkwide user. We present the DRA algorithm and a sketch of its proof under an initial set of simplifying albeit realistic assumptions. Later, we relax these assumptions to accommodate pragmatic aspects such as missing or delayed “reports”, clock skew, tampered “reports”, etc. We believe that such algorithms will have widespread applications in the future, particularly in intrusion-detection systems.