A cryptographic file system for UNIX
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Design and Implementation of a Transparent Cryptographic File System for UNIX
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
StegFS: A Steganographic File System for Linux
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
Two Practical and Provably Secure Block Ciphers: BEARS and LION
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Mnemosyne: Peer-to-Peer Steganographic Storage
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Replication is not needed: single database, computationally-private information retrieval
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hiding Data Accesses in Steganographic File System
ICDE '04 Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Data Engineering
A Capability-Based Transparent Cryptographic File System
CW '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Cyberworlds
A Framework for the Analysis of Mix-Based Steganographic File Systems
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A Shared Steganographic File System with Error Correction
MDAI '08 Sabadell Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Traffic analysis attacks on a continuously-observablesteganographic file system
IH'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information hiding
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Existing steganographic file systems enable a user to hide the existence of his secret data by claiming that they are (static) dummy data created during disk initialization. Such a claim is plausible if the adversary only sees the disk content at the point of attack. In a multi-user computing environment that employs untrusted shared storage, however, the adversary could have taken multiple snapshots of the disk content over time. Since the dummy data are static, the differences across snapshots thus disclose the locations of user data, and could even reveal the user passwords. In this paper, we introduce a Dummy-Relocatable Steganographic (DRSteg) file system to provide deniability in multi-user environments where the adversary may have multiple snapshots of the disk content. With its novel techniques for sharing and relocating dummy data during runtime, DRSteg allows a data owner to surrender only some data and attribute the unexplained changes across snapshots to the dummy operations. The level of deniability offered by DRSteg is configurable by the users, to balance against the resulting performance overhead. Additionally, DRSteg guarantees the integrity of the protected data, except where users voluntarily overwrite data under duress.