Fuzzy interval cooperative games

  • Authors:
  • Lina Mallozzi;Vincenzo Scalzo;Stef Tijs

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125 Naples, Italy;Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Naples Federico II, Monte S. Angelo, 80126 Naples, Italy;CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • Fuzzy Sets and Systems
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We introduce a core-like concept (called F-core) for games in which the worth of any coalition is given by means of a fuzzy interval. Such a class of cooperative games was introduced by Mares in 1999. Different from Mares' approach, the F-core generalizes the interval core introduced by Alparslan, Branzei and Tijs in 2008 for games where the worth of any coalition is a compact interval of the real line. Moreover, we introduce a balanced-like condition and prove that this condition is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty.