Detecting sybil nodes in static and dynamic networks

Authors:
José Antonio Cárdenas-Haro;Goran Konjevod
Affiliations:
School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ;School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
Venue:
OTM'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: Part II
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Peer-to-peer systems are known to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack. The lack of a central authority allows a malicious user to create many fake identities (called Sybil nodes) pretending to be independent honest nodes. The goal of the malicious user is to influence the system on his/her behalf. In order to detect the Sybil nodes and prevent the attack, we use here a reputation system for every node, built through observing its interactions with its peers. The construction makes every node a part of a distributed authority that keeps records on the reputation and behavior of the nodes. Records of interactions between nodes are broadcast by the interacting nodes and honest reporting proves to be a Nash Equilibrium for correct (non-Sybil) nodes. We argue that in realistic communication schedule scenarios, simple graph-theoretic queries help in exposing those nodes most likely to be Sybil.