An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Analysis of algorithms: computational methods and mathematical tools
Analysis of algorithms: computational methods and mathematical tools
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Key Infection: Smart Trust for Smart Dust
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Group-based key pre-distribution in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Analytic Combinatorics
Key Levels and Securing Key Predistribution against Node Captures
Algorithmic Aspects of Wireless Sensor Networks
From key predistribution to key redistribution
Theoretical Computer Science
On the role of expander graphs in key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks
WEWoRC'11 Proceedings of the 4th Western European conference on Research in Cryptology
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One of crucial disadvantages of key predistribution schemes for ad hoc networks is that if devices A and B use a shared key K to determine their session keys, then any adversarial device that holds K can impersonate A against B (or vice versa). Also, the adversary can eavesdrop communication between A and B for the lifetime of the system. We develop a dynamic scheme where a system provider periodically broadcasts random temporal keys (e.g. via a GSM network) encrypted with keys from the main predistribution pool. Shared temporal keys (and not the keys from the main pool) are used to establish session keys. The trick is that the scheme broadcast is organized in such a way that with a high probability two devices share much more temporal keys than the keys from the main pool of keys. It is a kind of paradox, but this makes it possible not only to protect communication against an adversary that has collected a large fraction of keys from the main pool, but also makes the system well suited for authentication purposes.