Reasoning about probabilistic security using task-PIOAs

  • Authors:
  • Aaron D. Jaggard;Catherine Meadows;Michael Mislove;Roberto Segala

  • Affiliations:
  • Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ;Naval Research Lab, Washington, DC;Tulane University, New Orleans, LA;University of Verona, Italy

  • Venue:
  • ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Task-structured probabilistic input/output automata (Task-PIOAs) are concurrent probabilistic automata that, among other things, have been used to provide a formal framework for the universal composability paradigms of protocol security. One of their advantages is that that they allow one to distinguish high-level nondeterminism that can affect the outcome of the protocol, from low-level choices, which can't. We present an alternative approach to analyzing the structure of Task-PIOAs that relies on ordered sets. We focus on two of the components that are required to define and apply Task-PIOAs: discrete probability theory and automata theory. We believe our development gives insight into the structure of Task-PIOAs and how they can be utilized to model crypto-protocols. We illustrate our approach with an example from anonymity, an area that has not previously been addressed using Task-PIOAs. We model Chaum's Dining Cryptographers Protocol at a level that does not require cryptographic primitives in the analysis. We show via this example how our approach can leverage a proof of security in the case a principal behaves deterministically to prove security when that principal behaves probabilistically.