Prescriptive and descriptive obligations in dynamic epistemic deontic logic

Authors:
Guillaume Aucher;Guido Boella;Leendert Van Der Torre
Affiliations:
Computer Science and Communications Department, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Torino, Italy;Computer Science and Communications Department, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Venue:
AICOL-I/IVR-XXIV'09 Proceedings of the 2009 international conference on AI approaches to the complexity of legal systems: complex systems, the semantic web, ontologies, argumentation, and dialogue
Year:
2009

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Abstract

Normative sentences can be used to change or to describe the normative system, known as prescriptive and descriptive obligations respectively. In applications of deontic logic it is important to distinguish these two uses of normative sentences. In this paper we show how they can be distinguished and analysed in a Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic.