Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
A Minimax Game of Power Control in a Wireless Network under Incomplete Information
A Minimax Game of Power Control in a Wireless Network under Incomplete Information
Convex Optimization
Power allocation games for MIMO multiple access channels with coordination
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Game-theoretic deployment design of small-cell OFDM networks
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Capacity of fading channels with channel side information
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
The Water-Filling Game in Fading Multiple-Access Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Competitive spectrum management with incomplete information
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
The waterfilling game-theoretical framework for distributed wireless network information flow
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking - Special issue on dynamic spectrum access: from the concept to the implementation
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A Bayesian game-theoretic model is developed to design and analyze the resource allocation problem in K-user fading multiple access channels (MACs), where the users are assumed to selfishly maximize their average achievable rates with incomplete information about the fading channel gains. In such a game-theoretic study, the central question is whether a Bayesian equilibrium exists, and if so, whether the network operates efficiently at the equilibrium point. We prove that there exists exactly one Bayesian equilibrium in our game. Furthermore, we study the network sum-rate maximization problem by assuming that the users coordinate according to a symmetric strategy profile. This result also serves as an upper bound for the Bayesian equilibrium. Finally, simulation results are provided to show the network efficiency at the unique Bayesian equilibrium and to compare it with other strategies.