Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Convex Optimization
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Power Control in Wireless Cellular Networks
Foundations and Trends® in Networking
Fundamentals of Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks: Theory and Algorithms
Fundamentals of Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks: Theory and Algorithms
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Energy-aware utility regions: multiple access Pareto boundary
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Power Management in MIMO Ad Hoc Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control in multicarrier CDMA systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Competition Versus Cooperation on the MISO Interference Channel
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We consider noncooperative energy-efficient resource allocation in the interference channel. Energy efficiency is achieved when each system pays a price proportional to its allocated transmit power. In noncooperative game-theoretic notation, the power allocation chosen by the systems corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. We study the existence and characterize the uniqueness of this equilibrium. Afterwards, pricing to achieve energy-efficiency is examined. We introduce an arbitrator who determines the prices that satisfy minimum QoS requirements and minimize total power consumption. This energy-efficient assignment problem is formulated and solved. We compare our setting to that without pricing with regard to energy-efficiency by simulation. It is observed that pricing in this distributed setting achieves higher energy-efficiency in different interference regimes.