EROS: a fast capability system
Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
The KeyKOS Nanokernel Architecture
Proceedings of the Workshop on Micro-kernels and Other Kernel Architectures
Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Building secure high-performance web services with OKWS
ATEC '04 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Preventing privilege escalation
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Improving host security with system call policies
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Making information flow explicit in HiStar
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Labels and event processes in the Asbestos operating system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Securing distributed systems with information flow control
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Wedge: splitting applications into reduced-privilege compartments
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
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In a bid to limit the harm caused by ubiquitous remotely exploitable software vulnerabilities, the computer systems security community has proposed primitives to allow execution of application code with reduced privilege. In this paper, we identify and address the vital and largely unexamined problem of how to structure implementations of cryptographic protocols to protect sensitive data despite exploits. As evidence that this problem is poorly understood, we first identify two attacks that lead to disclosure of sensitive data in two published state-of-the-art designs for exploit-resistant cryptographic protocol implementations: privilege-separated OpenSSH, and the HiStar/DStar DIFC-based SSL web server. We then describe how to structure protocol implementations on UNIX- and DIFC-based systems to defend against these two attacks and protect sensitive information from disclosure. We demonstrate the practicality and generality of this approach by applying it to protect sensitive data in the implementations of both the server and client sides of OpenSSH and of the OpenSSL library.