Integer and combinatorial optimization
Integer and combinatorial optimization
Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the complexity of equilibria
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Introduction to Algorithms
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cooperative facility location games
Journal of Algorithms - Special issue: SODA 2000
Computing equilibria in multi-player games
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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In a buyer-supplier game, a special type of assignment game, a distinguished player, called the buyer, wishes to purchase some combinatorial structure. A set of players, called suppliers, offer various components of the structure for sale. Any combinatorial minimization problem can be transformed into a buyer-supplier game. While most previous work has been concerned with characterizing the core of buyer-supplier games, in this paper we study optimization over the set of core vectors. We give a polynomial time algorithm for optimizing over the core of any buyer-supplier game for which the underlying minimization problem is solvable in polynomial time. In addition, we show that it is hard to determine whether a given vector belongs to the core if the base minimization problem is not solvable in polynomial time. Finally, we introduce and study the concept of focus point price, which answers the question: If we are constrained to play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium?