A general approximation technique for constrained forest problems
SODA '92 Proceedings of the third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
When Trees Collide: An Approximation Algorithm for theGeneralized Steiner Problem on Networks
SIAM Journal on Computing
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the origin of power laws in Internet topologies
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Measuring ISP topologies with rocketfuel
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Inferring link weights using end-to-end measurements
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
Variable Sociability in Agent-Based Decision Making
ATAL '99 6th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VI, Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL),
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
BRITE: An Approach to Universal Topology Generation
MASCOTS '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium in Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems
Service overlay networks: SLAs, QoS, and bandwidth provisioning
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On-line generalized Steiner problem
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Online algorithms in memoriam, Steve Seiden
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
A design framework towards the profitable operation of service overlay networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Socially-aware network design games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Pure nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Models and Algorithms for the Design of Service Overlay Networks
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
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In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, where connectivity is due to Autonomous Systems' choices, but also of overlay networks, where each user client can decide the set of connections to establish. Recent works have used game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash equilibrium, to characterize stable networks created by a set of selfish agents. The majority of these works assume that users are completely non-cooperative, leading, in most cases, to inefficient equilibria. To improve efficiency, in this paper we propose two novel socially-aware network design games. In the first game we incorporate a socially-aware component in the users' utility functions, while in the second game we use additionally a Stackelberg (leader-follower) approach, where a leader (e.g., the network administrator) architects the desired network buying an appropriate subset of network's links, driving in this way the users to overall efficient Nash equilibria. We provide bounds on the Price of Anarchy and other efficiency measures, and study the performance of the proposed schemes in several network scenarios, including realistic topologies where players build an overlay on top of real Internet Service Provider networks. Numerical results demonstrate that (1) introducing some incentives to make users more socially-aware is an effective solution to achieve stable and efficient networks in a distributed way, and (2) the proposed Stackelberg approach permits to achieve dramatic performance improvements, designing almost always the socially optimal network.