CHI '91 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Affordance, conventions, and design
interactions
Gathering evidence: use of visual security cues in web browsers
GI '05 Proceedings of Graphics Interface 2005
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Do security toolbars actually prevent phishing attacks?
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
What do they "indicate?": evaluating security and privacy indicators
interactions - A contradiction in terms?
Why Johnny can't encrypt: a usability evaluation of PGP 5.0
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
The Emperor's New Security Indicators
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Examining the impact of website take-down on phishing
Proceedings of the anti-phishing working groups 2nd annual eCrime researchers summit
End-user privacy in human-computer interaction
Foundations and Trends in Human-Computer Interaction
Security and identification indicators for browsers against spoofing and phishing attacks
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Exploring User Reactions to New Browser Cues for Extended Validation Certificates
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Browser interfaces and extended validation SSL certificates: an empirical study
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
An evaluation of extended validation and picture-in-picture phishing attacks
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
UAHCI'13 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Universal Access in Human-Computer Interaction: design methods, tools, and interaction techniques for eInclusion - Volume Part I
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In this paper, we aim at providing conceptual and empirical insights to the design of security indicators in web browsers. In examining why security indicators in web browsers fail to warn users about web frauds, we propose affordance-based principles for our new design of web authentication indicators. Following these principles, we present a new design for Extended Validation (EV) certificate interface in the Firefox browser. We then conduct an exploratory qualitative study to evaluate three different versions of EV indicators. Our findings offer some preliminary implications for the designs of more effective web authentication indicators.