On the psychology of truth-gaps

Authors:
Sam Alxatib;Jeff Pelletier
Affiliations:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology;University of Alberta
Venue:
ViC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 international conference on Vagueness in communication
Year:
2009

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Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature

Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature
Contradictions at the borders

ViC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 international conference on Vagueness in communication

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Abstract

Bonini et al. [2] present psychological data that they take to support an 'epistemic' account of how vague predicates are used in natural language. We argue that their data more strongly supports a 'gap' theory of vagueness, and that their arguments against gap theories are flawed. Additionally, we present more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies super- and subvaluationary approaches to vagueness.