Communications of the ACM
REGRET: reputation in gregarious societies
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Reputation and social network analysis in multi-agent systems
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Credulous and Sceptical Argument Games for Preferred Semantics
JELIA '00 Proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
A Social Mechanism of Reputation Management in Electronic Communities
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
Towards Trust-Based Acquisition of Unverifiable Information
CIA '08 Proceedings of the 12th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XII
An Algorithm for Computing Semi-stable Semantics
ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2006
Collective argument evaluation as judgement aggregation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On judgment aggregation in abstract argumentation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the issue of reinstatement in argumentation
JELIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
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The exchange of information is in many multi-agent systems the essential form of interaction. For this reason, it is crucial to keep agents from providing unreliable information. However, agents that provide information have to balance between being highly competent, in order to achieve a good reputation as information provider, and staying incompetent, in order to minimize the costs of information acquisition. In this paper, we use a multi-agent simulation to identify conditions under which it is profitable for agents either to make an investment to become competent, or to economize and stay incompetent. We focus on the case where the quality of the acquired information cannot objectively be assessed in any immediate way and where hence the information end users have to rely on secondary methods for assessing the quality of the information itself, as well as the trustworthiness of those who provide it.