ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The UCONABC usage control model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The inlined reference monitor approach to security policy enforcement
The inlined reference monitor approach to security policy enforcement
JavaScript instrumentation for browser security
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Execution monitoring enforcement under memory-limitation constraints
Information and Computation
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Security-by-contract on the .NET platform
Information Security Tech. Report
Run-Time Enforcement of Nonsafety Policies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
Lightweight self-protecting JavaScript
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Towards Practical Enforcement Theories
NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
Synthesising monitors from high-level policies for the safe execution of untrusted software
ISPEC'08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Using equivalence relations for corrective enforcement of security policies
MMM-ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mathematical methods, models and architectures for computer network security
A theory of runtime enforcement, with results
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Corrective Enforcement: A New Paradigm of Security Policy Enforcement by Monitors
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A quantitative approach for inexact enforcement of security policies
ISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security
From qualitative to quantitative enforcement of security policy
MMM-ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security: computer network security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The current theory of runtime enforcement is based on two properties for evaluating an enforcement mechanism: soundness and transparency. Soundness defines that the output is always good ("no bad traces slip out") and transparency defines that good input is not changed ("no surprises on good traces"). However, in practical applications it is also important to specify how bad traces are fixed so that the system exhibits a reasonable behavior. We propose a new notion of predictability which can be defined in the same spirit of continuity in real-functions calculus. It defines that there are "no surprises on bad input". We discuss this idea based on the feedback of an industrial case study on e-Health.