An introduction to database systems: vol. I (4th ed.)
An introduction to database systems: vol. I (4th ed.)
Formal methods in the development of CICS
The Computer Bulletin
Synchronization with eventcounts and sequencers
Communications of the ACM
Social processes and proofs of theorems and programs
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Database Security and Integrity
Database Security and Integrity
Notes on Data Base Operating Systems
Operating Systems, An Advanced Course
The Lattice Security Model In A Public Computing Network
ACM '78 Proceedings of the 1978 annual conference
Sequencing computation steps in a network
SOSP '81 Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Object representation on a heterogeneous network
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
NAMING AND PROTECTION IN EXTENDABLE OPERATING SYSTEMS
NAMING AND PROTECTION IN EXTENDABLE OPERATING SYSTEMS
A large-scale interactive administrative system
IBM Systems Journal
Combining Discretionary Policy with Mandatory Information Flow in Operating Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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This paper examines the Clark and Wilson model for commercial data integrity and proposes an implementation based on the author's secure capability architecture. The paper shows how secure capabilities and protected subsystems are ideal for implementing commercial data integrity, but also raises areas where the Clark and Wilson model may have difficulties in actual use. The level of formal verification required appears higher than most commercial systems would be willing to try, and the user interface for specifying separation of duties appears extremely complex.