The SeaView security model

Authors:
Dorothy E. Denning;Teresa F. Lunt;Roger R. Schell;William R. Shockley;Mark Heckman
Affiliations:
Digital Equipment Corp., Systems Research Center, Palo Alto, CA and SRI International, Computer Science Laboratory, Menlo Park, CA;SRI International, Computer Science Laboratory, Menlo Park, CA;Gemini Computers, Inc., Carmel, CA;Gemini Computers, Inc., Carmel, CA;Gemini Computers, Inc., Carmel, CA
Venue:
SP'88 Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
Year:
1988

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Abstract

A formal security policy model that uses basic view concepts for a secure multilevel relational database system is described. The model is formulated in two layers, one corresponding to a security kernel or reference monitor that enforces mandatory security, and the second defining multilevel relations and formalizing policies for labeling new and derived data, data consistency, discretionary security, and transaction consistency. This includes the policies for sanitization, aggregation, and downgrading. The model also defines application-independent properties for entity integrity, referential integrity, and polyinstantiation integrity.