Communications of the ACM
Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations
Communications of the ACM
Types, bytes, and separation logic
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
TPHOLs '09 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
seL4: formal verification of an operating-system kernel
Communications of the ACM
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
capDL: a language for describing capability-based systems
Proceedings of the first ACM asia-pacific workshop on Workshop on systems
The road to trustworthy systems
Proceedings of the fifth ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
Towards proving security in the presence of large untrusted components
SSV'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Systems software verification
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The seL4 microkernel was the world's first general-purpose operating system kernel with a formal, machine-checked proof of correctness. The next big step in the challenge of building truly trustworthy systems is to provide a framework for developing secure systems on top of seL4. This paper first gives an overview of seL4's correctness proof, together with its main implications and assumptions, and then describes our approach to provide formal security guarantees for large, complex systems.