Revisiting the security of the ALRED design

  • Authors:

  • Marcos A. Simplício, Jr.;Paulo S. L. M. Barreto;Tereza C. M. B. Carvalho

  • Affiliations:

  • Laboratory of Computer Architecture and Networks, Escola Politécnica, University of São Paulo, Brazil;Laboratory of Computer Architecture and Networks, Escola Politécnica, University of São Paulo, Brazil;Laboratory of Computer Architecture and Networks, Escola Politécnica, University of São Paulo, Brazil

  • Venue:
  • ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The Alred construction is a lightweight strategy for constructing Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Although its original analysis shows that this construction is secure against attacks not involving internal collisions, it is unclear if the same is valid in a more generic scenario. In this paper, we complement that analysis, showing that one can expect a reasonable security level even when attackers try to explore such collisions. More specifically, we use the game-playing technique to formally evaluate the security of one Alred instance, Marvin, bounding its security in a quantitative manner; the security analysis is in the concrete-security paradigm. We then show how the concepts involved can be used in the analysis of Pelican, which follows the same design principles.