Vulnerabilities of wireless key exchange based on channel reciprocity

Authors:
Nico Döttling;Dejan Lazich;Jörn Müller-Quade;Antonio Sobreira de Almeida
Affiliations:
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe, Germany;Institute of Telecommunications and Applied Information Theory, University of Ulm, Germany and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Ka ...;Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe, Germany;Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of Informatics, Karlsruhe, Germany
Venue:
WISA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information security applications
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Wireless key exchange on the physical layer is a key exchange protocol independent of computational assumptions. It relies only on the physical properties of the wireless channels to generate a common secret key between two parties. Precise conditions, however, for such a key exchange to be secure remain unclear. An argument why unconditional security does not hold for general scenarios is provided. Finally, a novel side-channel attack against such key exchange schemes is described and experimentally validated.