Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the Exact Security of Full Domain Hash
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Algorithms for Pairing-Based Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Unlinkable Secret Handshakes and Key-Private Group Key Management Schemes
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
ESAS'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Security and privacy in ad-hoc and sensor networks
WCC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Coding and Cryptography
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It is now a trend that Internet users are increasingly concerned about individual privacy, and as a result numerous privacypreserving authentication techniques have been proposed. In this paper, we propose the concept of private handshakes with optional identifiability, which allows the two users in a handshake deciding real time to either proceed their interaction as secret handshake or as private handshake. Such optionally identifiable private handshakes are a more flexible privacy-preserving authentication primitive than secret handshakes and private handshakes. We formulate a formal definition for optionally identifiable private handshakes, as well as a set of security definitions, and propose a concrete scheme. We implement a proof-of-concept prototype of the proposed scheme, on top of the widely used TLS protocol.