A new set of passive routing attacks in mobile ad hoc networks

Authors:
Jiejun Kong;Xiaoyan Hong;Mario Gerla
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, CA;Computer Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, CA;Computer Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, CA
Venue:
MILCOM'03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE conference on Military communications - Volume II
Year:
2003

Citing 9
Cited 3

Highly dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) for mobile computers

SIGCOMM '94 Proceedings of the conference on Communications architectures, protocols and applications
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms

Communications of the ACM
Secure pebblenets

MobiHoc '01 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks

Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
ANODR: anonymous on demand routing with untraceable routes for mobile ad-hoc networks

Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing

WMCSA '99 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computer Systems and Applications
SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

WMCSA '02 Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
Preserving privacy in a network of mobile computers

SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PGP in constrained wireless devices

SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9

Opening the Pandora's Box: Exploring the fundamental limitations of designing intrusion detection for MANET routing attacks

Computer Communications
Compromising anonymous communication systems using blind source separation

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ARDEN: Anonymous networking in delay tolerant networks

Ad Hoc Networks

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In hostile environments, adversaries can launch passive attacks against interceptable routing information embedded in routing messages and data packets. Allowing adversaries to trace network routes and infer the motion pattern of nodes at the end of those routes may pose a serious threat to covert operations. In this paper we propose a feasible adversary model of such attacks, then present several instantiations and study the principles of designing corresponding countermeasures. We demonstrate that existing ad hoc routing protocols are vulnerable to passive attacks: in the feasible adversary model, (a) the location and motion patterns of mobile nodes can be traced, while (b) proactive and reactive/on-demand ad hoc routes across multiple mobile nodes can be visualized by the adversary. We conclude that ad hoc networks deployed in hostile environments need new countermeasures to resist such passive attacks.