Security Refresh: Protecting Phase-Change Memory against Malicious Wear Out

  • Authors:
  • Nak Hee Seong;Dong Hyuk Woo;Hsien-Hsin Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Georgia Institute of Technology;Intel Labs;Georgia Institute of Technology

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Micro
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

As dynamic RAM scaling approaches its physical limit, phase-change memory is the most mature and well-studied option for potential DRAM replacement. However, malicious wear-out attacks can exploit PCM's limited write endurance. To address this, a low-cost wear-leveling scheme can dynamically randomize the data addresses across the entire address space and obfuscate their actual locations from users and system software.