Internet cost structures and interconnection agreements
Internet economics
The economics of Internet interconnection agreements
Internet economics
ISP survival guide: strategies for running a competitive ISP
ISP survival guide: strategies for running a competitive ISP
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Dynamics of hot-potato routing in IP networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
CoNEXT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Interconnecting eyeballs to content: a shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
On cooperative settlement between content, transit and eyeball internet service providers
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
ICQT'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet charging and QoS technologies: economics of converged, internet-based networks
The public option: a non-regulatory alternative to network neutrality
Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
CIPT: using tuangou to reduce IP transit costs
Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
Cooperative virtual machine management for multi-organization cloud computing environment
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
On the problem of revenue sharing in multi-domain federations
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
The price of tussles: bankrupt in cyberspace?
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
An economic analysis of routing conflict and its resolution
Performance Evaluation
The public option: a nonregulatory alternative to network neutrality
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Within the current Internet, autonomous ISPs implement bilateral agreements, with each ISP establishing agreements that suit its own local objective to maximize its profit. Peering agreements based on local views and bilateral settlements, while expedient, encourage selfish routing strategies and discriminatory interconnections. From a more global perspective, such settlements reduce aggregate profits, limit the stability of routes, and discourage potentially useful peering/connectivity arrangements, thereby unnecessarily balkanizing the Internet. We show that if the distribution of profits is enforced at a global level, then there exist profit-sharing mechanisms derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value and its extensions that will encourage these selfish ISPs who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to a Nash equilibrium. We show that these profit-sharing schemes exhibit several fairness properties that support the argument that this distribution of profits is desirable. In addition, at the Nash equilibrium point, the routing and connecting/peering strategies maximize aggregate network profits and encourage ISP connectivity so as to limit balkanization.