A middleware for securing mobile mashups

  • Authors:
  • Florent Batard;Karima Boudaoud;Michel Riveill

  • Affiliations:
  • I3S Laboratory- CNRS/University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis, France;I3S Laboratory- CNRS/University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis, France;I3S Laboratory- CNRS/University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis, France

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 20th international conference companion on World wide web
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Mashups on traditional desktop devices are a well-known source of security risks. In this paper, we examine how these risks translate to mobile mashups and identify new risks caused by mobile-specific characteristics such as access to device features or offline operation. We describe the design of SCCM, a platform independent approach to handle the various mobile mashup security risks in a consistent and systematic manner. Evaluating an SCCM implementation for Android, we find that SCCM successfully protects against common attacks such as inserting a malicious widget from the outside.