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This paper demonstrates how to prevent or mitigate insider threats in relational databases. It shows how different order of accesses to the same data items may pose different levels of threat. Moreover, it states the conditions that are required to regard a data item as expired. In addition, it introduces the two different methods of executing insiders' tasks, and how to prevent insider threat in those. The models presented in this paper organize accesses to data items in a particular sequence so that the availability of data items is maximized and the expected threat is minimized to the lowest level. Furthermore, it determines when to give an insider an incorrect but acceptable value of a risky data item in order to prevent a possible threat.