A formal analysis of authentication in the TPM

  • Authors:
  • Stéphanie Delaune;Steve Kremer;Mark D. Ryan;Graham Steel

  • Affiliations:
  • LSV, ENS Cachan & CNRS & INRIA Saclay Île-de-France, France;LSV, ENS Cachan & CNRS & INRIA Saclay Île-de-France, France;School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK;LSV, ENS Cachan & CNRS & INRIA Saclay Île-de-France, France

  • Venue:
  • FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware chip designed to enable computers to achieve a greater level of security than is possible in software alone. To this end, the TPM provides a way to store cryptographic keys and other sensitive data in its shielded memory. Through its API, one can use those keys to achieve some security goals. The TPM is a complex security component, whose specification consists of more than 700 pages. We model a collection of four TPM commands, and we identify and formalise their security properties. Using the tool ProVerif, we rediscover some known attacks and some new variations on them. We propose modifications to the API and verify our properties for the modified API.