Characterizing kernel malware behavior with kernel data access patterns

  • Authors:

  • Junghwan Rhee;Zhiqiang Lin;Dongyan Xu

  • Affiliations:

  • Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN;Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN;Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Characterizing malware behavior using its control flow faces several challenges, such as obfuscations in static analysis and the behavior variations in dynamic analysis. This paper introduces a new approach to characterizing kernel malware's behavior by using kernel data access patterns unique to the malware. The approach neither uses malware's control flow consisting of temporal ordering of malware code execution, nor the code-specific information about the malware. Thus, the malware signature based on such data access patterns is resilient in matching malware variants. To evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, we first generated the signatures of three classic rootkits using their data access patterns, and then matched them with a group of kernel execution instances which are benign or compromised by 16 kernel rootkits. The malware signatures did not trigger any false positives in benign kernel runs; however, kernel runs compromised by 16 rootkits were detected due to the data access patterns shared with the compared signature(s). We further observed similar data access patterns in the signatures of the tested rootkits and exposed popular rootkit attack operations by ranking common data behavior across rootkits. Our experiments show that our approach is effective not only to detect the malware whose signature is available, but also to determine its variants which share kernel data access patterns.