DigSig: Runtime Authentication of Binaries at Kernel Level
LISA '04 Proceedings of the 18th USENIX conference on System administration
Foreign Code Detection on the Windows/X86 Platform
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Self-signed executables: restricting replacement of program binaries by malware
HOTSEC'07 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX workshop on Hot topics in security
Alcatraz: An Isolated Environment for Experimenting with Untrusted Software
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SoftwarePot: an encapsulated transferable file system for secure software circulation
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Comprehending module dependencies and sharing
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering - Volume 2
CodeShield: towards personalized application whitelisting
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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Securing Windows is a challenge because of its large attack surface which can lead to many ways where binaries can be loaded and subsequently executed. Furthermore, the software in the system is itself dynamic as binaries need to be installed, updated and uninstalled. Binaries can also be created dynamically during software development as well as other situations. We present a new binary security model called BinInt which provides integrity for binaries and prevents the use of unauthorized binaries. We have implemented a BinInt prototype designed with usability in mind to be compatible with existing software in binary form. It has low overhead and thus can be permanently on.