Cryptanalysis of a simple three-party password-based key exchange protocol

  • Authors:
  • Eun-Jun Yoon;Kee-Young Yoo

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National University, 1370 Sankyuk-Dong, Buk-Gu, Daegu 702-701, South Korea;Department of Computer Engineering, Kyungpook National University, 1370 Sankyuk-Dong, Buk-Gu, Daegu 702-701, South Korea

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Communication Systems
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In order to secure communications between two clients with a trusted server's help in public network environments, a three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol is used to provide the transaction confidentiality and the efficiency. In 2009, Huang proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (HS-3PAKE) protocol without any server's public key. By analysis, Huang claimed that the proposed HS-3PAKE protocol is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient than previously proposed 3PAKE protocols. However, this paper demonstrates that HS-3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attacks and off-line password guessing attacks by any other user. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.