TinyECC: A Configurable Library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Wireless Sensor Networks
IPSN '08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information processing in sensor networks
NBK: A Novel Neighborhood Based Key Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks
ICNS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Fifth International Conference on Networking and Services
Location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Review: Detecting node replication attacks in wireless sensor networks: A survey
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
| Hi-index | 0.89 |
Location information has been paid much more attention in sensor network key management schemes. In 2006, Zhang et al. proposed a location-based key management scheme by binding private keys of individual nodes to both their identities and locations. In this Letter, however, we show that their scheme cannot resist key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack, and does not achieve forward secrecy. In fact, an adversary who compromises the location-based secret key of a sensor node A, can masquerade as any other legitimate node or even fake a node to establish the shared key with A, as well as decrypt all previous messages exchanged between A and its neighboring nodes. We then propose a new scheme which provides KCI resilience, perfect forward secrecy and is also immune to various known types of attacks. Moreover, our scheme does not require any pairing operation or map-to-point hash operation, which is more efficient and more suitable for low-power sensor nodes.