How (Not) to design strong-RSA signatures

  • Authors:
  • Marc Joye

  • Affiliations:
  • Technicolor, Security & Content Protection Labs, Cesson-Séévigné Cedex, France 35576

  • Venue:
  • Designs, Codes and Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

This paper considers strong-RSA signature schemes built from the scheme of Cramer and Shoup. We present a basic scheme encompassing the main features of the Cramer-Shoup scheme. We analyze its security in both the random oracle model and the standard model. This helps us to spot potential security flaws. As a result, we show that a seemingly secure signature scheme (Tan in Int J Security Netw 1(3/4): 237---242, 2006) is universally forgeable under a known-message attack. In a second step, we discuss how to turn the basic scheme into a fully secure signature scheme. Doing so, we rediscover several known schemes (or slight variants thereof).