CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Password hardening based on keystroke dynamics
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptographic Key Generation from Voice
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Guide to Biometrics
Secure smartcardbased fingerprint authentication
WBMA '03 Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMM workshop on Biometrics methods and applications
Combining Crypto with Biometrics Effectively
IEEE Transactions on Computers
An Efficient and Accurate Iris Segmentation Technique
DICTA '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Digital Image Computing: Techniques and Applications
Biometrics: a tool for information security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Theoretical and Practical Boundaries of Binary Secure Sketches
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
How confident are you to counter uncertainty?
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security of Internet of Things
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Using biometrics for authentication or cryptosystems would require tolerance of errors of the order of 40%. Most of the proposed techniques either use the reliable bits of a biometric or good quality biometric which does not have such a large variation. However, biometric authentication can be viewed as a design of error correcting codes wherein the redundancy provides the tolerance to errors. This paper explores addition of redundancy to support variations as high as 40% in biometrics. We investigated the error characteristics of biometric templates and found that some blocks within the template tend to produce errors higher than the mean error. To handle this behavior we propose a two level correction. We extensively tested our proposed method using iris images from the commercial Bath dataset [13] and found that the proposed method can tolerate the errors with a success rate of 99.07%, while not accepting any imposters.