A framework for evaluating storage system security

  • Authors:
  • Erik Riedel;Mahesh Kallahalla;Ram Swaminathan

  • Affiliations:
  • Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, California;Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, California;Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, California

  • Venue:
  • FAST'02 Proceedings of the 1st USENIX conference on File and storage technologies
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

There are a variety of ways to ensure the security of data and the integrity of data transfer, depending on the set of anticipated attacks, the level of security desired by data owners, and the level of inconvenience users are willing to tolerate. Current storage systems secure data either by encrypting data on the wire, or by encrypting data on the disk. These systems seem very different, and currently there are no common parameters for comparing them. In this paper we propose a framework in which both types of systems can be evaluated along the security and performance axes. In particular, we show that all of the existing systems merely make different trade-offs along a single continuum and among a set of related security primitives. We use a trace from a time-sharing UNIX server used by a medium-sized workgroup to quantify the costs associated with each of these secure storage systems. We show that encrypt-on-disk systems offer both increased security and improved performance over encrypt-on-wire in the traced environment.