A smart card based authentication protocol for strong passwords

Authors:
Chin-Chen Chang;Hao-Chuan Tsai
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, R.O.C. and Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Chung Cheng Univ ...;Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Venue:
ACOS'06 Proceedings of the 5th WSEAS international conference on Applied computer science
Year:
2006

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Abstract

In 2003, Lin et al. proposed an enhanced protocol of optimal strong-password authentication protocol (OSPA). Recently, Chang and Chang showed that Lin et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to a server spoofing attack and a denial-of-service attack and then described an improved protocol. In this paper, we show that Chang-Chang's protocol is still vulnerable to a stolen-verifier attack. In addition, we also propose an improved protocol with better security.