Pricing the resource in computational market based on Bayes-game model

Authors:
Junguo Yu;Huaping Chen;Bing Liu
Affiliations:
Management School, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China;Management School, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China;Management School, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China
Venue:
ACOS'06 Proceedings of the 5th WSEAS international conference on Applied computer science
Year:
2006

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Abstract

This paper uses Bayes-game model to analysis the incomplete-information dynamic game, in which the resource providers and users of the computational market ask and bid around the potential equilibrium price. The linear strategy is used to find the equilibrium solution of the Bayes-game, set the deal condition for the resource exchange, and acquire the cost function of resource providers and the benefit function of resource users.