ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A nonce-based protocol for multiple authentications
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Proving Security Protocols Correct
LICS '99 Proceedings of the 14th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Scalability and Flexibility in Authentication Services: The KryptoKnight Approach
INFOCOM '97 Proceedings of the INFOCOM '97. Sixteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Driving the Information Revolution
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A correct security protocol should satisfy four requirements: no-intrusion, authenticity, freshness, and secrecy. We divide the four requirements into two groups (one for no-intrusion, authenticity, and freshness and the other for secrecy). For the former we use the message-exchange forms and for the latter, we use the p-knows and n-knows information that is inferred from a latest topological orders of the trigger-graph. Based on these methods, flaws and weaknesses hidden in an imperfect security protocol could be uncovered.