The economics of information security investment
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Correlating Intrusion Events and Building Attack Scenarios Through Attack Graph Distances
ACSAC '04 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Validating and restoring defense in depth using attack graphs
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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The most critical steps in the risk assessment of a system are the discovery of attacks against the system as well as the computation of the probabilities that attacks are successful and their impacts. We present a framework to support these steps driven by a detailed simulation of the attacks implemented by intelligent threat agents. The framework can evaluate the role of factors such as the probability of discovering a vulnerability, the resources available to agents, how an agent composes attacks into plans to reach a goal. The agents and their plans are described through a proper extension of attack graphs. A simulation defined in terms of attack graphs can fully exploit an important feature of these graphs, namely their ability of describing both attack plans and the countermeasures to stop these plans. Furthermore, a simulation-driven approach can evaluate how the availability of information about the system implementation influences the success of attack plans. Finally, we describe the tools that implement the simulation and that produce statistics about both attack plans that have been successfully implemented and the resulting risk for the system owner.