Computing Shapley's saddles

  • Authors:
  • Felix Brandt;Markus Brill;Felix Fischer;Paul Harrenstein;Jan Hoffmann

  • Affiliations:
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München;Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München;Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München;Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München;Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGecom Exchanges
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are playing an ever increasing role in the study of systems of autonomous agents. A common criticism of Nash equilibrium is that its existence relies on the possibility of randomizing over actions, which in many cases is deemed unsuitable, impractical, or even infeasible.