A prescriptive approach for playing games

  • Authors:
  • Michal Feldman

  • Affiliations:
  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGecom Exchanges
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Decision-Making lies in the foundations of fields such as Economics, Operations Research, and Artificial Intelligence. The question of what should be the action to be taken by a decision-maker when facing an uncertain environment, potentially including other decision makers, is a fundamental problem which has led to a wide variety of models and solutions. One of the only types of situations (of more than a single agent) for which this question got an agreed-upon answer is in the context of two-player zero-sum games. This setting can model any situation in which a decision-maker aims at maximizing her guaranteed payoff. When mixed strategies are allowed, such desired behavior, termed an agent's maximin (or safety level) strategy, leads to a well defined expected payoff (known as the value of the game). Moreover, when presented explicitly in a matrix form, the computation of a maximin strategy is polynomial (by solving a linear program).