Secretary problems and incentives via linear programming

  • Authors:
  • Niv Buchbinder;Kamal Jain;Mohit Singh

  • Affiliations:
  • Microsoft Research, New England;Microsoft Research, Redmond;Microsoft Research, New England

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGecom Exchanges
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

In the classical secretary problem an employer would like to choose the best candidate among n competing candidates that arrive in a random order. Our main contribution is a new linear programming technique that we introduce as a tool for obtaining and analyzing mechanisms for the secretary problem and its variants. The linear program is formulated using judiciously chosen variables and constraints and we show a one-to-one correspondence between mechanisms for the secretary problem and feasible solutions to the linear program.