On some logic games in their philosophical context

  • Authors:
  • Tero Tulenheimo

  • Affiliations:
  • STL, CNRS and University of Lille 3

  • Venue:
  • Ludics, dialogue and interaction
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In the present paper Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics and the dialogical logic of Lorenzen and Lorenz are discussed and compared from the viewpoint of their underlying philosophical meaning theories. The question of whether the proposed meaning theories can be claimed to suffer from circularity is taken up. The relations of the two frameworks to verificationist and anti-realist ideas are considered. Finally, van Heijenoort's concept of 'logic as calculus' generalized by Hintikka to the idea of 'language as calculus' will be reformulated as a view we label 'anti-universalism.' We discuss briefly the fourfold division of foundational views obtained by relating a distinction between 'universalism' and 'anti-universalism' to the distinction between 'realism' and 'anti-realism.'