STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Password Authentication Using Multiple Servers
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Session-Key Generation Using Human Passwords Only
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Server-Assisted Generation of a Strong Secret from a Password
WETICE '00 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols Immune to Dictionary Attacks
WET-ICE '97 Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Enabling Technologies on Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security analysis of a password-based authentication protocol proposed to IEEE 1363
Theoretical Computer Science
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
On diffie-hellman key agreement with short exponents
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Password based key exchange with mutual authentication
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
SP'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Security Protocols
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Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is one of the important topics in cryptography. It aims to address a practical security problem: how to establish secure communication between two parties solely based on a shared password without requiring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). After more than a decade of extensive research in this field, there have been several PAKE protocols available. The EKE and SPEKE schemes are perhaps the two most notable examples. Both techniques are however patented. In this paper, we review these techniques in detail and summarize various theoretical and practical weaknesses. In addition, we present a new PAKE solution called J-PAKE. Our strategy is to depend on well-established primitives such as the Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP). So far, almost all of the past solutions have avoided using ZKP for the concern on efficiency. We demonstrate how to effectively integrate the ZKP into the protocol design and meanwhile achieve good efficiency. Our protocol has comparable computational efficiency to the EKE and SPEKE schemes with clear advantages on security.