How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Towards action-refinement in process algebras
Information and Computation
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Keying Hash Functions for Message Authentication
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
CSP-CASL: a new integration of process algebra and algebraic specification
Theoretical Computer Science - Algebraic methods in language processing
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
Protocol Composition for Arbitrary Primitives
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Resettable public-key encryption: how to encrypt on a virtual machine
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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When discussing protocol properties in the symbolic (Dolev-Yao; term-based) model of cryptography, the set of cryptographic primitives is defined by the constructors of the term algebra and by the equational theory on top of it. The set of considered primitives is not easily modifiable during the discussion. In particular, it is unclear what it means to define a new primitive from the existing ones, or why a primitive in the considered set may be unnecessary because it can be modeled using other primitives. This is in stark contrast to the computational model of cryptography where the constructions and relationships between primitives are at the very foundation of the theory. In this paper, we explore how a primitive may be constructed from other primitives in the symbolic model, such that no protocol breaks if an atomic primitive is replaced by the construction. As an example, we show the construction of (symbolic) "randomized" symmetric encryption from (symbolic) one-way functions and exclusive or.